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Abstract
GRW Theory postulates a stochastic mechanism assuring that every so often
the wave function of a quantum system is ‘hit’, which leaves it in a localised
state. How are we to interpret the probabilities built into this mechanism?
GRW theory is a firmly realist proposal and it is therefore clear that these
probabilities are objective probabilities (i.e. chances). A discussion of the
major theories of chance leads us to the conclusion that GRW probabilities
can be understood only as either single case propensities or Humean objective
chances. Although single case propensities have some intuitive appeal in the
context of GRW theory, on balance it seems that Humean objective chances
are preferable on conceptual grounds because single case propensities suffer
from various well know problems such as unlimited frequency tolerance and
lack of a rationalisation of the principal principle.
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1 The spontaneous localisation approach to
quantum mechanics
The formalism of quantum mechanics (QM) allows for superpositions of
macroscopically distinguishable states. This stands in contradiction to the
fact that we experience objects as having determinate properties. Reconcil-
ing this feature of the quantum formalism with everyday experience is the
infamous measurement problem. In response to this problem von Neumann
suggested that upon measurement the Schro¨dinger dynamics is suspended
and the system collapses into some eigenstate of the measured observable
with a probability given by Born’s rule. This suggestion faces many well
known problems. What counts a measurement? At what point in the mea-
surement process does the state of the system collapse? And why should
properties of physical systems at all depend on there being observers?
One way to circumvent these difficulties is to change QM in way that
avoids reference to observers. This can be achieved by incorporating collapses
into the basic evolution of the system: collapses happen as a consequence of
the basic laws governing a physical system and do not need to be tacked
onto the theory as an occasional measurement-induced interruption of the
‘actual’ time evolution. This has far-reaching consequences in that it requires
an alteration of the basic equation of quantum mechanics, the Schro¨dinger
equation, to which a stochastic term is added bringing about the desired
reduction of the wave function. As a result, the wave function no longer
evolves deterministically; instead it evolves according to a stochastic process
that is similar but not equivalent to the Schro¨dinger evolution.
The idea to remould QM along these lines has been around since the
1970s, but it had its first breakthrough only in 1986 when Ghirardi, Rimini
and Weber presented a workable formulation of the sought-after stochastic
dynamics, now commonly referred to as ‘GRW theory’.1
Before discussing the theory in some detail, it is worth getting clear on
what the theory is expected to achieve. According to its progenitors, the
theory has to satisfy three requirements.
1The original paper is Ghirdi, Rimini & Weber (1986). Bassi & Ghirardi (2003) provide
a comprehensive survey. Semi- and non-technical presentations of the theory can be found,
among others, in Bell (1987), Ghirardi (1997a, 1997b, 2002, 2004), Ghirari & Rimini
(1990), and Rimini (2001).
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• Requirement 1. The theory has to solve the measurement problem;
that is, the dynamical laws have to be such that superpositions of
macroscopically distinguishable states are suppressed immediately.
• Requirement 2. Standard QM is a universal theory in the sense that
its application is not limited to a particular domain: microscopic and
macroscopic objects alike are governed by the fundamental law of the
theory, the Schro¨dinger equation. The fundamental law of GRW theory
must be universal in the same way.2
• Requirement 3. The theory has to be empirically adequate; in partic-
ular, it has to reproduce the well-known ‘quantum behaviour’ when
applied to microscopic objects and classical behaviour when applied to
macroscopic objects.
The theory is based on two sets of assumptions; the first is concerned
with the nature of the localisation processes, and the second with when they
occur.
The localisation process. Three assumptions are needed to pave the
ground for a mathematical formulation of the localisation process. First,
a choice needs to be made about the basis in which the localisations occur.
GRW theory regards position as the relevant basis and posits that so-called
hits3 lead to a localisation with respect to position.4 Second, at what level
are hits effective? GRW theory posits that the elementary constituents of a
system (the molecules or atoms from which it is built up), rather than entire
system, are subjected to hits. Third, the hits change the state (the wave
function) of a the affected constituent, and not its density matrix.5 It is im-
portant to bear this point in mind, in particular because the basic equation
of motion of the theory will be formulated in terms of density matrices.
A localisation process transforms the state |ψ〉 of the system into another,
more localised state,
2Rimini (2001, p. 137) refers to this as ‘computational covariance’.
3As we shall see later on, there are important differences between the collapses postu-
lated by von Neumann and the localisation processes of GRW theory. For this reason we
do not refer to the latter as ‘collapses’ and call them ‘hits’ instead.
4This choice is partially motivated by conceptual reasons, and partially by the fact that
the localisation mechanicsm of GRW theory can be shown not to work for variables other
than position.
5See Bassi & Ghirardi (2003, pp. 291-2) for a discussion of this assumption.
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|ψ〉 −→ Lˆ
k
x|ψ〉
‖Lˆkx|ψ〉‖
, (1)
where the localisation operator Lˆkx is a linear, self-adjoint operator localising
the kth particle around the point x in the three-dimensional physical space.
The localisation centre x is chosen at random according to
Pk(x) = ‖Lˆkx|ψ〉‖2. (2)
The choice of this distribution assures that the predictions of GRW theory
do not differ significantly from the predictions of standard QM as it ensures
that the probability for hits is high in those regions in which the standard
QM probabilities for collapses are high too.
The localisation operator is a Gaussian of the form
Lˆkx =
(
α
pi
)3/4
exp
[
−α
2
(qˆk − x)2
]
, (3)
where qˆk is the position operator for the k
th particle and α is a constant that
is chosen such that 1/
√
α = 10−7m, which is the distance between the peaks
of localisation of two terms in a superposition above which the superposition
is suppressed.
The occurrence of localisation processes. When and how often do localisa-
tion processes occur? GRW theory assumes that these occurrences constitute
a Poisson process. Generally speaking, Poisson processes are processes char-
acterised in terms of the number of occurrences of a particular type of event
in a certain interval of time τ , for instance the number of people passing
through a certain point during time τ . These events are Poisson distributed
if
p(E = m) =
e−λτ (λτ)m
m!
, (4)
where E is the number of events occurring during τ , m = 0, 1, 2, ..., and λ is
the parameter of the distribution. The mean value of the Poisson distribution
is λ, and hence λ can be interpreted as the average number of events occurring
per unit time (i.e. λ can be interpreted as a mean frequency). Furthermore,
and this is crucial for what follows, the probability of an event occurring
during the infinitesimal interval dt is λdt.
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The mean frequency of the distribution governing the hits of the kth con-
stituent is λk, for all k. Nothing in principle rules out that there be different
frequencies for every micro constituent. However, the theory assumes that
they all have the same frequency: λk = λmicro for all k. Numerical considera-
tions show that λmicro ∼= 10−16s−1.
On the basis of these assumptions one can now derive the fundamental
equation of motion. From a technical point of view, as Eq. (1) indicates, the
reduction mechanism transforms a pure state into a mixture (which is also
intuitively plausible if we adopt an ignorance interpretation of mixtures: we
do not know what the localisation centre will be). From Eqs. (1) and (2) we
then get:
|ψ〉〈ψ| −→
∫
R
3
d3xPk(x)
Lˆkx|ψ〉〈ψ|Lˆkx
‖Lˆkx|ψ〉‖2
=
∫
R
3
d3xLˆkx|ψ〉〈ψ|Lˆkx (5)
We can now define
Tk[|ψ〉〈ψ|] :=
∫
R
3
d3xLˆkx|ψ〉〈ψ|Lˆkx, (6)
with which Eq. (5) becomes
|ψ〉〈ψ| −→ Tk[|ψ〉〈ψ|]. (7)
Notice that in case the initial state of the particle is a mixture ρ rather than
a pure state, the effect of the localising process remains the same: ρ changes
into T [ρ].
Now consider the change of the density matrix ρ during the interval
dt. The total change of ρ during dt is the sum of the changes due to the
Schro¨dinger evolution, (dρ)
S
, which governs the system when no hits occur,
and the changes due to the hits, (dρ)
H
, weighted by the respective probabil-
ities that they occur:
dρ = p
S
(dρ)
S
+ p
H
(dρ)
H
(8)
The Schro¨dinger time evolution of a density operator is given by dρ/dt =
−(i/h¯)[Hˆ, ρ], where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian of the system. From this we im-
mediately get:
(dρ)
S
= − i
h¯
[Hˆ, ρ] dt. (9)
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From Eq. (7) we obtain:
(dρ)
H
= Tk[ρ]− ρ. (10)
Because the hits are Poisson distributed we have p
H
= λk dt and pS = 1 −
λk dt. Putting these expressions together and dividing by dt yields:
dρ
dt
= − i
h¯
[Hˆ, ρ] − λk(ρ− Tk[ρ]), (11)
which describes the effect of time evolution of the kth particle on the state
of the system. We obtain the equation of motion of the entire system by
summing over all particles:
dρ
dt
= − i
h¯
[Hˆ, ρ] −
n∑
k=1
λk(ρ− Tk[ρ]), (12)
where λk = λmicro for all k. This is the fundamental equation of GRW theory.
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How does the theory fare with the requirements mentioned at the begin-
ning?
Requirement 1. Consider a particle with two possible states7 |S1〉 and
|S2〉 and let |M0〉, |M1〉 and |M2〉 be the states of the measurement device
measuring the particle (ready, pointer pointing to ‘1’ and pointer pointing to
‘2’). Before the measurement the state of the entire system consisting of the
particle and the measurement device is |M0〉(c1|S1〉 + c2|S2〉), where c1 and
c2 are complex number such that |c1|2 + |c2|2. In the measurement process
this state evolves into c1|M1〉|S1〉 + c2|M2〉|S2〉, which is a superposition of
macroscopically distinguishable states.
The GRW dynamics implies that this superposition is reduced (essen-
tially) to one of its terms almost immediately with the appropriate prob-
abilities. To see how this happens consider the position representations of
the above states, and take into account that the wave function of the mea-
surement device is the tensor product of the wave functions of its n micro
constituents: ψ
Ml
(r1, ..., rn) = µl,1(r1) ... µl,n(rn), l = 1, 2, where the µl,k(rk)
6Notice that we retrieve the standard Schro¨dinger equation if we let all λk tend towards
zero, which, of course, means that no hits occur.
7For the sake of simplicity we only consider two states; the generalisation to any number
of states is straightforward.
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are functions that are sharply peaked in a three dimensional interval Il as-
sociated with the position of the pointer when it points to ‘l’. For the sake
of calculational ease we now consider a one-dimensional system, assume that
the two intervals are centred around −a (for ‘1’) and a (for ‘2’) respectively,
and posit that all µl,k(rk) are Gaussians centred exactly at −a and a (rather
than in a finite interval around these points):8
µ1(rk) = (1/N)e
− γ
2
(rk+a)
2
and µ2(rk) = (1/N)e
− γ
2
(rk−a)2 , (13)
where the second subscript has been dropped because the functions are the
same for all k; N is a normalisation constant. The post-measurement wave
function then reads
φ(r1, ..., rn+1) =
1
Nn
[
c1 µ1(r1) ... µ1(rn)ψ1(rn+1)+ c2 µ2(r1) ... µ2(rn)ψ2(rn+1)
]
.
(14)
Now assume that the hit occurs around a (the arguments are exactly the
same if we choose −a), in which case the localisation operator becomes
Lˆka = (α/pi)
3/4e−
α
2
(rk−a)2 . (15)
The post-hit wave function then is
Lˆka φ(r1, ..., rn+1) =
1
N ′
[
c1 µ1(r1) ... Lˆ
k
aµ1(rk) ... µ1(rn)ψ1(rn+1) +
c2 µ2(r1) ... Lˆ
k
aµ2(rk) ... µ2(rn)ψ2(rn+1)
]
. (16)
What is the effect of the change of the wave function of the kth particle on
the post-hit wave function? The Gaussian centred around a is left virtually
unchanged as Lˆkaµ2(rk) ' exp[(α+γ2 )(rk − a)2]. By contrast, the Gaussian
centred around −a is seriously affected. We have Lˆkaµ1(rk) ' exp[−α2 (rk −
a)2] exp[−γ
2
(rk+a)
2], which in the vicinity of−a is exp[−αa2
2
] exp[−γ
2
(rk+a)
2];
that is, the wave function centred around−a is damped exponentially. Hence,
a localisation process centred around a transforms c1|M1〉|S1〉 + c2|M2〉|S2〉
into c′2|M2〉|S2〉+‘a negligible bit’. According to the hit mechanism of GRW,
8As a look at the calculation below soon reveals, the main conclusion - that a super-
position gets reduced to one of its terms - remains unaltered if these assumptions are
relaxed.
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each constituent of the pointer is hit with frequency λmicro, which, as we shall
see when discussing Requirement 2, add up and so the whole system is hit
about every 107 times per second. Hence, the superposition is suppressed
immediately. Moreover, some calculations show that the probability for a to
be chosen as the centre of localisation is almost |c2|2.
In passing we should mention that this solution to the measurement prob-
lem is not without difficulties. As the calculations show, GRW hits do only
exponentially suppress all but one term of the superposition but fail to com-
pletely eliminate them. This has become known as the ‘tails problem’: is
exponential suppression sufficient to assure that pointers have definite read-
ings? That is, is the ‘negligible bit’ really negligible? This problem, which is
intimately related to the question of how to interpret the theory, has sparked
a lively debate (see for instance Frigg (2003)). However, this and related
questions need not concern us here; in what follows we assume that the tails
problem can be solved in one way or another and that GRW theory provides
a viable solution to the measurement problem.
Requirement 2. To begin with, notice that the fundamental equation of
the theory, Eq. (12), does not come with any specification about acceptable
values of n, nor about the values of other parameters in the equation (such
as the mass of the object). Hence, prima facie n = 1 is not ruled out and the
theory is applicable to a single macroscopic object. However, macroscopic
objects consists of many microscopic objects and it now needs to be shown
that the effective motion of n microscopic objects is the same as the one
obtained from applying Eq. (12) to the macro object directly.
To this end GRW prove (1986, section 6) that if we start with a system
composed of n microscopic particles, described by Eq. (12), then the dynam-
ics of the centre of mass of the system separates from its internal dynamics
and is described by:
dρ
dt
= − i
h¯
[Hˆ, ρ] − λmacro(ρ− T [ρ]), (17)
where the index k has been dropped in T (i.e. T [ρ] := T1[ρ]) because there
is only one object, the centre of mass. The relation between the macro and
the micro frequencies is given by
λmacro =
n∑
k=1
λk. (18)
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Assuming that all λk have the same value (see above) this reduces to: λmacro =
nλmicro. Given that a macroscopic object is made up of about 10
23 micro
constituents, this implies: λmacro ∼= 107.
This is the sought-after result: the equation describing the reduced dy-
namics of the centre of mass has exactly the same form as Eq. (12) and the
value of λmacro assures that the system’s state, should it ever evolve into a
superposition, is reduced almost immediately to one of its terms.
Requirement 3. As the discussion of Requirement 1 showed, the GRW
formalism reproduces QM predictions (given by Born’s rule) for measure-
ments carried out on microscopic objects. As these have been confirmed to
high degree, GRW is empirically adequate as regards microscopic systems.
How does GRW theory compare (a) with what the Schro¨dinger dynamics
and (b) with the classical motion when we consider macroscopic objects?
GRW answer these questions by considering a free particle moving in one
dimension. In response to (a) they prove that the position and momentum
mean values are not affected by the stochastic term in that they coincide with
what Schro¨dinger evolution predicts: 〈qˆ〉S = 〈qˆ〉GRW and 〈pˆ〉S = 〈pˆ〉GRW . In
response to (b) they prove that Ehrenfest’s theorem holds true for the GRW
dynamics and that the expectation values for qˆ and pˆ follow the classical
trajectories.
These results are limited in scope because they are only valid for a free
particle, but they provide evidence that the theory predicts the correct results
at least in a simple case. Given that the relation between classical and
quantummechanics is notoriously beset with riddles, this is not a bad starting
point.
In sum, GRW theory meets the three requirements and we should there-
fore seriously consider the possibility that it is the true theory of (non-
relativistic) particle mechanics. (We discuss some of the difficulties that
it faces in the last section). The theory is fundamentally probabilistic in
that it attributes two stochastic processes to nature: the choice of a centre
of localisation and the times at which these localisations occur. How can we
interpret the probabilities involved in these stochastic processes? This is the
question we discuss in this paper.
Before we begin our discussion of this question, let us add a proviso about
GRW theory itself. In fact, this this theory is not without problems. The
dynamics of the theory does not preserve the required symmetries of wave
functions describing systems of identical particles. Moreover it is an ‘aes-
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thetic’ drawback of the theory that although the state reduction happens at
the level of the wave function rather than the density matrix, the fundamen-
tal equation of the theory is expressed in terms of the density matrix; ideally
one would like to have an equation governing the evolution of the state vector
itself. Both these difficulties are overcome within the so-called CSL model
(for ‘continuous spontaneous localization’).9
The model belongs to the same family of proposals as GRW theory as
it also solves the measurement problem by an appeal to spontaneous locali-
sation processes and satisfies the other requirements mentioned earlier in in
section. The essential difference is that the discontinuous hits of GRW the-
ory are replaced by a continuous stochastic evolution of the state vector in
Hilbert space (similar to a diffusion process). Accordingly, the mathematical
apparatus of the CSL model is different from that of GRW theory, but the
leading ideas as well as the physical implications remain unaltered. For this
reason we think that the following discussion of the interpretation of GRW
probabilities mutatis mutandis carries over to the CSL model.
2 Probabilities in GRW theory - preliminary
remarks
GRW theory belongs to a family of approaches to quantum theory that has
been labelled as ‘quantum theories without observers’. These approaches
renounce an appeal to observers to ensure that quantum objects have definite
properties. As we have seen in the last section, in GRW theory this aim is
accomplished by adding a stochastic term to the fundamental equation of
the theory. As a result, probabilities are a basic aspect of the evolution of
a physical system and do not in any way depend on there being observers
who perform measurements - in fact the notion of a measurement does not
appear in the theory at all. Ghirardi is explicit about this:
‘I would like to stress that they [the spontaneous processes of lo-
calization in space] are to be understood as fundamental natural
9The model has originally been suggested by Pearle (1989) and Ghirardi, Pearle &
Rimini (1990). Bassi & Ghirardi (2003, Chs. 7 and 8) provide a comprehensive survey;
short and less technical statements of the model can be found in Ghirardi (1997b), and
Ghirardi & Rimini (1990).
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processes that owe nothing to interactions with other physical sys-
tems or to deliberate actions on the part of conscious observers.
On the contrary, the idea is that the space-time in which physical
processes develop exhibits some fundamentally stochastic, ran-
dom aspects, which induce precisely the spontaneous localizations
of the microscopic constituents of the universe.’ (Ghirardi 2004,
p. 406)
‘... no observer carries out any measurement: nature itself (Ein-
stein’s God?) chooses to induce such a process according to ran-
dom choices but with precise probabilities.’ (Ghirardi 2004, p.
409)
This feature of GRW theory rules out epistemic probabilities and credences
as possible interpretations of the probabilities in GRW theory; these must
be objective probabilities (or chances, as we shall say).
What are the options for understanding their nature? Philosophical re-
views of the interpretive options regarding objective chances traditionally
mention several possible accounts: the classical interpretation, logical proba-
bility, frequentism, propensity theories, Humean Best Systems accounts, and
accounts that understand ‘probability’ as a theoretical term (see for instance
Galavotti 2005, Gillies 2001, Howson 1995, Ha´jek 2003 or Mellor 2005). For
quantum mechanical probabilities in general, and GRW probabilities in par-
ticular, the first two options can be discounted immediately.
The remaining theories come in different variants. We will discuss each in
turn, whereby we focus on their ability to serve as an interpretation of GRW
probabilities. Needless to say, each of these theories is open to various well-
known objections, which need not be repeated here; we touch upon them only
if the criticisms bear on the relevance of a particular account to probabilities
in GRW.
3 Frequentism
Frequentism is the view that the probability of a particular event A (getting
heads when tossing a coin, say) is the relative frequency of As in a series of
trials, i.e. the fraction of trials on which A occurs. Different versions of fre-
quentism differ in how they flesh out this idea. Actual (or finite) frequentism
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takes the probability of A to be the relative frequency of As in a series of
actual trials, presumably finite. Hypothetical frequentism associates proba-
bilities with limiting relative frequencies within suitable infinite sequences of
trials, presumably non-actual.
Frequency accounts (of any stripe) do not sit well with GRW theory, both
for conceptual and technical reasons. First, frequentism regards probabilities
as properties of sequences, but GRW theory treats probabilities as part of a
theoretically postulated law and does not refer to sequences at all. Accord-
ingly there is a substantial difference in the way in which the values of the
probabilities in question are determined. Frequentists regard the sequence
as primary and then determine the probability of a particular event through
statistical analysis of this sequence.10 The way GRW theory treats prob-
ability is diametrically opposed to this point of view. The theory tells us
what happens as time unfolds and it does not refer to given sequences, either
actual or hypothetical, at any point. The determination runs the other way:
if we are interested in limiting frequencies at all, the physical description of
the system provided by the theory is used to calculate limiting frequencies.
Of course it can (and indeed should) be argued that the frequencies of events
cannot diverge arbitrarily from the theoretically postulated probabilities (we
come back to this point below), but rejecting arbitrary divergence of the two
is not much of an argument for identifying them.
Second, as has been pointed out by many (among them the founding
fathers of QM)11, probabilities in QM refer to single cases. QM gives us the
probability for the occurrence of some particular event at the next relevant
instant of time (measurements in standard QM and hits in GRW), no matter
what the history of the system, or even the world as a whole, is. Given a
quantum system in a particular state, it has a certain chance of manifesting
a particular property when hit regardless of what has happened to similar
systems in the past or will happen to them in the future. In fact, QM assigns
probabilities to events no matter how often they actually occur. They may
occur not at all, or only once. In cases of these sorts, the actual frequencies
simply cannot match the quantum mechanical probabilities, nor even come
close to them in general.
10This is true in both actual and hypothetical frequentistm. In this vein von Mises
declares: ‘first the collective - then the probability’ (1939, p. 18).
11See Galavotti (2001) for a survey.
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This closes the door on actual frequentism, but leaves hypothetical fre-
quentism unscathed. So one might try to overcome the first objection by
renouncing an all too literal understanding of the theory and thereby bring-
ing hypothetical frequentism back on the table. However, even if an inter-
pretation of GRW probabilities as concealed hypothetical frequencies could
be made plausible somehow, any attempt to reinstall frequentism as a viable
interpretation of GRW probabilities is undercut by the following technical
difficulties.
The best formulation of frequentism is von Mises’.12 His theory is based
on the notion of a collective, an infinite sequence S of attributes selected
from a finite or denumerably infinite set of attributes, satisfying the axioms
of convergence and randomness (roughly, the first says that for each attribute
the relative frequency of that attribute in S tends towards a finite limit, and
the second requires that there is no recursively specified infinite subsequence
of S in which this is not true and in which the relative frequencies differ
from those in S). It can be shown that these axioms imply that successive
members of a collective are probabilistically independent (Howson 1995, p.
15; Gillies 2000, p. 106). This condition, as von Mises himself emphasises,
is often not satisfied if successive results are produced by the same device or
system. Hence, a frequentist interpretation of the probabilities of sequence
thus produced is only possible if one can prove that the dynamics of the
system is such that subsequent events are indeed independent.
This is not the case for at least one of the two random processes in-
volved in GRW theory. While the Poisson distributed occurrences of hits
are independent,13 subsequent localisation events are not. Let Hx be a hit
with centre x and regard the Hx as the space of attributes of the frequen-
tist’s sequence.14 Now return to the example introduced in section 1 in
connection with the measurement problem. Let t and t′ (t′ > t) be the
12Of course, with some ramifications due to later writers; but none of these ramifications
matter to our argument.
13Poisson distributed events are independent in the following sense: the number of
events in two disjoint (i.e. non-overlapping) intervals are independent random variables
that follow themselves a Poisson distribution.
14Notice that there is a further problem at this point. Von Mises’ definition of a collective
requires that the set of attributes be finite or denumerably infinite, but the set of all Hx
is non-denumerable because x ranges over R3. However, we think that this problem can
be solved by either suitably redefining a collective or discretising space.
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two instants of time at which two consecutive hits occur: at t the hit that
transforms the post-measurement state into the ‘post-hit state’ (14) occurs,
and at t′ the post-hit state is hit again and transformed into yet another
state. Then consider the probability that the second hit (occurring at t′)
is centred around a, p(Ha at t
′ |Ha at t). It follows from Eqs. (2) and (14)
that p(Ha at t
′|Ha at t) equals almost one, while p(H−a at t′|Ha at t) equals al-
most zero. By the same token, p(H−a at t′|H−a at t) equals almost one, while
p(Ha at t
′|H−a at t) equals almost zero. Now we see that the probability of
the occurrence of Ha and H−a depends on where in the sequence they occur:
Ha is significantly more likely after Ha than after H−a, and vice versa; in
other words, these events are not independent. And they’d better not be!
The absence of independence is what guarantees the regular behaviour of
macroscopic objects. If the pointer is at a after the measurement we expect
it to stay there. Independence would imply that macroscopic objects would
jump around randomly, hardly something that an empirically adequate the-
ory can predict. For this reason consecutive hits do not form a collective and
von Mises’ scheme is inapplicable to GRW theory. Given that von Mises’
scheme (suitably ramified) is the best frequentist game in town, this leaves
the frequentist with empty hands.15
The frequentist might now counter that this objection is spurious because
it builds on a mischievous choice of the attribute set. The relevant attributes
are not, so the objection goes, the hits Hx themselves, but the shape of the
wave function itself at the instance of a hit.
This suggestion does not further the frequentist’s cause. Because of the
way the hit mechanism is defined - a hit amounts to multiplying the pre-hit
wave function with a Gaussian centred around x - the wave function always
bears traces of its entire history and is not ‘reset’ in the way it is after a
von Neumann collapse. As a consequence, the system never has exactly
the same wave function at two different instants of time between which at
least one collapse has occurred.16 Hence, attributes in this new attribute
15Von Mises (1939, Ch. 6) discusses sequences that do not satisfy the axiom of random-
ness and formulates a procedure to reconstruct them as a combination of two sequences
that are collectives. In this way, he argues, his theory is applicable to (at least some)
sequences that are not collectives. However, the procedure he outlines is not applicable in
the case of GRW because it involves a probability distribution over initial conditions that
has simply no place in GRW theory.
16Proof. Let |ψ0〉 be the wave function of the system at some (arbitrary) instant. The
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set never recur. This stands in contradiction to von Mises’ requirement that
each attribute has to recur infinitely many times. Again, we have to conclude
that GRW theory cannot be squeezed into the frequentist’s corset.
Finally, let us briefly address the question of why frequentism has at least
some initial plausibility in standard QM while it is so fundamentally at odds
with GRW theory. The reason for this is that the events that are meant
to form the collective (and fail to do so in the case of GRW theory) are
entirely different in the following way. In the context of standard QM one
considers quantum systems prepared in a well-defined state |ψ〉, which is then
measured. It is then (usually more or less tacitly) assumed that we either
have a large collection of systems all prepared in this state, or, if we make
repeated trials with the same system, that the system is prepared in state |ψ〉
before every measurement. Of course, these measurements are independent.
GRW hits are completely different. There is no ‘time out’ between hits to
‘reset’ the state; hits occur and they act on whatever state the system is left in
the aftermath of the previous hit and the unitary evolution between two hits.
The theory does not leave any room for the kind of state preparation that is
presupposed when a frequency interpretation of standard QM probabilities
is given.17
claim that the shape of the wave function is repeatable amounts to claiming that for
some number of hits m > 0: |ψ0〉 = |ψm〉 := (1/Nm)Lˆkmxm ...Lˆk1x1 |ψ0〉, where 1/Nm is a
normalisation constant. This is possible under two circumstances: either (a) all Lˆkixi ,
i = 1, ...,m, are the identity function; or (b) the result of the multiplication of the Lˆkixi ,
i = 1, ...,m is the identity function. However, GRW theory stipulates that the hit functions
are Gaussians and thereby rules out that either of these conditions can be true: (a) the
identity function is not a Gaussian and therefore not admissible; (b) the multiplication of
any number of Gaussians never yields the identity function. Hence the shape of the weave
function is not repeatable.
17One might try to salvage a frequentist interpretation of GRW probabilities by claiming
that this sort of independence is available in GRW theory as well: the collective, by
definition, is a set of systems prepared in the same quantum state, which then are hit
under the dynamics of the theory. This, however, is only possible if we allow for collectives
that don’t have more than one actual member, the rest being fictional entities. Building
a frequency interpretation on such a collective seems patiently absurd.
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4 Humean best system accounts
In a series of papers David Lewis (1980, 1986, 1994) developed a novel
Humean approach to objective chances (i.e., an approach that explicitly es-
chews irreducible modalities, powers, necessary connections and so forth)
that he felt could meet all the needs of science. Since 1994 other accounts
more or less similar to Lewis’ have been developed, e.g. by Loewer (2001,
2004), and Hoefer (2006). We will call this family of accounts ‘HBS views’,
for ‘Humean Best System’. What the members of the family have in common
is the Humean stance (a kind of nominalism with respect to chances), and the
claim that while the objective chances supervene on the patterns to be found
in the actual events making up the world’s history (the ‘Humean mosaic’),
they do not supervene simply (as, e.g., is the case with actual frequentism).
Lewis’ account (1994) is in fact a proposal for how to understand laws
of nature as well as objective probabilities. Lewis invites us to consider all
deductive systems that make true claims about the Humean mosaic, and,
perhaps, also make assertions about the probability of certain events hap-
pening in certain circumstances. A contingent generalisation is a law if and
only if it appears as a theorem or axiom in the best system (or all the best
systems if there are several equally good systems). If it happens that the best
system includes laws giving probabilities for various types of events, rather
than only strict universal generalizations, then the objective chances in our
world are just what those laws say they are (Lewis 1994, p. 480). In what
follows we will refer to chances thus defined as ‘HBS chances’.
The best system is the one that strikes the best balance between sim-
plicity, strength and fit. The latter notion is specific to Lewis’ account and
therefore needs introduction. A theory that assigns chances to events also
assigns a chance to certain courses of history, among them the actual course
of history. The fit of a theory is defined to be that chance; that is, the fit
of a theory is the likelihood that it assigns to actual course of events. By
stipulation, systems that do not involve chances have perfect fit. From this
it follows that a theory T1 has a better fit than a theory T2 if the probability
that T1 assigns to the actual course of history is greater than the probability
that T2 assigns to it. As an example consider a Humean mosaic consisting
of a finite sequence of ten coin tosses: HTHHTHTTHT. Theory T1 says that
the chance of getting heads is 0.5; theory T2 says that the chance of getting
heads is 0.1. The probability that T1 assigns to the actual course of history is
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greater that the probability that T2 assigns to that history: 0.5
10 > 0.15 0.95
Hence T1 has better fit than T2.
Can GRW probabilities be interpreted as HBS chances? The issue we
need to address first is what the Humean mosaic consists of. While Lewis
did not presume to dictate what exactly the Humean mosaic in fact contains
in our world, he did insist that it be Humean in the sense of not involving,
intrinsically, any necessary connections between distinct regions. He suggests
that this requirement is best met by an ontology based on space-time points
plus local field quantities representing material stuff (e.g. electromagnetic
fields, perhaps mass and charge densities, and so forth). First appearances
notwithstanding, this squares rather well with GRW theory. The theory
is formulated against the background of a classical space-time, which is in
line with Lewis’ position. However, there are questions about the existence
of relevant local field quantities. The theory’s basic object, the wave func-
tion, exists in a 3n-dimensional configuration space, whereas the relevant
space-time background is four-dimensional. Whether there is a serious mis-
match between GRW theory and the Lewisian requirement depends on how
one interprets the theory.18 One possibility is to view GRW theory as a
‘wave only theory’, i.e. as a theory whose basic ontology consists of the 3n-
dimensional wave (such a position is suggested, for instance, in Clifton and
Monton (1999)). On the basis of such an interpretation it would indeed be
difficult to define a Humean mosaic along the lines suggested by Lewis (al-
though, perhaps, Lewis (2005) provides remedy). However, there are other
interpretations of the theory which do not give rise to difficulties of that
sort. As Bell (1987, 204-5) pointed out, although the wave-function lives
in a 3n dimensional Hilbert space, the GRW hits are localised in ordinary
3-dimensional physical space and time in that each is centred around a partic-
ular space time point (x, t). Two interpretations in particular make this fact
palpable: the mass density interpretation (see Ghirardi, Grassi & Benatti
(1995), Ghirardi (1997c), and Monton (2004)) and the flash interpretation
(which was somehow alluded to by Bell (ibid.) and which was then worked
out by, among others, Tumulka (2006)). The former introduces a continuous
matter density in ‘ordinary’ 3-dimensional space, whose shape is determined
by the wave function. Accordingly, a hit amounts to a localisation of the mass
density around the point at which the hit occurs. On the flash interpretation,
18For a discussion of the problem of interpreting GRW theory see Peter Lewis (2005).
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the primitive ontology of the theory consists of flashes, which occur at the
exact space time points where a hit occurs; an object then is understood as
nothing but a swarm of such flashes. We have some reservations about the
metaphysical plausibilty of the flash interpretation (how do ordinary objects
‘emerge’ from a swarm of flases?), but this need not occupy us here. What
matters in the current context is that both the matter density interpretation
and the flash interpretation give rise to a Humean mosaic of the kind that
Lewis envisaged. The mass density is a field which is defined at every point
(x, t) of a four dimensional space time. This is exactly what Lewis envisaged
and hence the Humean mosaic of GRW theory with a mass density interpre-
tation can be define exactly as suggested in Lewis’ original account. On the
flash interpretation, the Humean mosaic is a ‘pointilist picture’ consisting of
the flashes occurring at each (x, t).
Assuming that the mosaic is as just described, does GRW theory qualify
as the Humean Best System? Let us discuss each requirement in turn. First,
is GRW theory Humean? Yes, it is. Hits are occurrent events and the theory
does not make reference to any hidden powers or mechanisms, explaining
these occurrences, which would be unacceptable from a Humean perspec-
tive. GRW themselves are explicit about this: ‘we do not consider [...] the
problem of physical origin of these localizations for microscopic systems [...],
but we simply postulate that they occur. In this sense we say that they are
spontaneous’ (1986, p. 471).
Second, is GRW a system in the relevant sense? The answer to this ques-
tion is less straightforward. A system in Lewis’ sense encompasses all (or
at least all basic) sciences; i.e. it is total science. There is no question that
GRW theory is not a system of that kind. So, strictly speaking HBS is not
applicable to GRW. There are two responses to this problem. (a) One can
argue that although GRW theory itself is not a system of the kind required,
every system of that kind (present or future) needs to incorporate GRW the-
ory, or something very much like it (we discuss further developments of the
theory in the last section). The main obstacle for this take on the matter is
that, orchestrated efforts notwithstanding, no generally accepted relativistic
version of a GRW type theory has been formulated yet. As Ghirardi admits,
this is a serious problem and unless a relativistic version can be formulated
the programme can not be regarded as providing a true fundamental the-
ory (Ghirardi 2004, p. 419 and p. 436). However, progress is being made
(e.g. Tumulka 2006) and there are reasons to remain hopeful that a relativis-
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tic spontaneous localisation theory will eventually be forthcoming and that
GRW theory can be understood as part of a best system in Lewis’ sense.
(b) In Hoefer’s (2006) version of HBS no system of the ‘total science variety’
is required. He argues that the HBS criteria can be applied to individual
theories irrespective of whether or not they form part of an all-encompassing
system. From this point of view there simply is no question of whether GRW
theory is a system of the right kind; it is a theory about non-relativistic
objects, and that is all we need.
We regard either of these responses as reasonable and therefore conclude
that GRW theory does fall within the scope of HBS theories of chance.
Third, is GRW theory the best system in the sense that it strikes the best
balance between simplicity, strength and fit?19
(a) Fit. There are two questions: (i) Is Lewis’ notion of fit applicable
to the random processes postulated by GRW theory? (ii) If so, how good
is the fit? The first question is best answered by looking at each of the
random processes in turn. The occurrence of hits is governed by a Poisson
distribution. This distribution gives the probability for there being a certain
number of hits in a particular interval of time. This interval can be chosen
to be the unit interval, in which case Eq. (4) gives us the probabilities for
one hit, two hits, etc. to occur in each unit time interval. This is exactly
the kind of information we need to apply to the above notion of fit: we
look at consecutive unit intervals, count how many hits occurred, calculate
the probability of the actual history of the system and compare it with what
alternative theories would say. If GRW’s Poisson distribution assigns a higher
probability to the actual history than its contenders it has better fit. In the
case of localisation process things are a bit less straightforward. Eq. (2) is a
probability density and hence the probability of there being a hit exactly at
x is always zero and accordingly all possible histories have zero probability.20
A possible solution is to put a grid on space (i.e. coarse grain space) and look
at the (finite!) probabilities that the centre of collapse is within a certain cell
of the grid. As these cells can be chosen arbitrarily small (as long as they
have finite measure), the shift from a continuum to a grid in order to judge fit
does not seem to be problematic. In this way we get the finite probabilities
19To be more precise, the question either is whether GRW theory forms part of the best
system (if you stick with Lewis’ original proposal), or whether it is the best theory about
its own domain (if you side with Hoefer’s views).
20This problem is not specific to GRW; it also crops up in standard QM.
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of discrete localisation events that we need in order to apply Lewis’ notion
of fit.21
With this in place, we can now turn to the second question and ask how
good the theory’s fit is. There is no direct way to tell because GRW hits per
se are unobservable and experimental results are our only basis to come to
a judgement about how good the fit of a theory is. GRW theory reproduces
the predictions of standard QM, at least within the range of experimental
testability.22 Given that standard QM is highly successful in the sense that
its probabilistic predictions match the measured frequencies perfectly, GRW
theory is equally successful. If we now assume that hits indeed do exist (this
is substantial ‘if’, we shall come back this point below), then we have good
reasons to belief that the actual hits match the theoretically postulated ones
rather closely; if they did not, we would see experimental violations of basic
predictions, which we do not.
(b) Strength. As we just mentioned, the theory reproduces the predictions
of standard QM, which is, from an instrumental point of view, a highly
successful theory with a large set of consequence which, so far, all were
empirically confirmed. Hence, GRW theory is on par with standard QM in
terms of strength, which makes it a very strong theory.
(c) Simplicity. GRW theory probably does not get the highest scores
when it comes to simplicity, as standard QM is arguably the simpler theory.
However, since standard QM is beset with a serious conceptual problem, the
measurement problem, it is not in the race for the best system at all. So the
question is whether GRW theory is simpler than other serious contenders.
This is difficult to judge because GRW so far is the only game in town
(other theories of the same type can be shown not to be empirically adequate
or suffer from other serious problems; see Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) for a
survey). Hence GRW wins by default, as it were.
Hence, we conclude that if hits actually do occur, then GRW theory quali-
21In a recent paper Adam Elga (2004) has pointed out that Lewis’ notion of fit fails to
be informative in systems with infinitely many random events. As time is unbounded in
GRW theory it falls within this category. However, the solution that Elga suggests also
works for GRW theory and hence this problem need not concern us here.
22For instance, there are differences in what the two theories predict about supercon-
ductors, but the effects are so small that they cannot be detected (Rimini 1995). See
Ghirardi (2001) and Benatti, Ghirardi & Grassi (1995) for a general discussion of GRW
and experiments.
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fies as the best system and the probabilities occurring in it can be interpreted
as Humean objective chances. However, hits of the sort postulated by GRW
theory (and that we assumed to be part of the Humean mosaic) are un-
observable it is therefore debatable whether we should assume the Humean
mosaic to include them. If we decide that we should not, then matters open
up. Now if, for example, point particles actually exist and their continuous
trajectories form part of the mosaic, then presumably Bohmian mechanics,
or something like it, strikes the best balance between strength and fit. How-
ever, so far there is no experimental evidence telling against one or the other
view of what the Humean mosaic consists of and as long as this is the case
GRW theory is a serious contender for the best system, and its probabilities
can be understood as objective Humean chances.
For what follows it is important to notice that HBS accounts of chance
have two (closely related) desirable features. First, they incorporate a signif-
icant - but not unlimited - amount of frequency tolerance. Frequency toler-
ance is the ability of an account of objective chance to accept the possibility
that the actual relative frequencies of chance-governed events be different
than the objective chance itself. The actual frequency view, of course, has
zero frequency tolerance; and as we will see below, propensity accounts typ-
ically have, in principle, an unlimited frequency tolerance. HBS accounts
avoid both extremes on frequency tolerance. On the one hand the require-
ment that fit be maximised assures that the chance of an event is as close
as possible to its relative frequency because the the closer the chances are to
the relative frequencies that better the fit of the theory. On the other hand,
HBS accounts allow for a certain mismatch of frequencies and chances if this
mismatch is compensated by a gain in simplicity and/or strength. However,
there are limits to trade-offs like this. If in a certain domain, e.g. radium
decay, the frequencies mismatch the QM chances, that reduces the level of fit
that the system has; but presumably, for minor mismatches, the gain in fit
we could obtain by adding a new law to QM specifically to cover just radium
decays is more than outweighed by the loss of simplicity engendered in the
system. However, this tolerance of mismatches must have a limit. If radium
decays consistently displayed a pattern matching a half-life 10 times longer
than that dictated by QM, then matters would be reversed: the gain in fit
obtained by writing a special decay law just for radium would more than
outweigh the loss in simplicity. In sum, the frequency patterns in the mosaic
may mismatch the objective chances, but not by a large amount over a large
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span of world history. Whether this is a strength of the view or a weakness
is an issue we come back to below.
Second, HBS accounts can rationalise the Principal Principle (PP), roughly
the proposition that our subjective probabilities for an event A to happen
should match what we take to be its objective chance. Using c[ · | · ] to de-
note subjective probabilities (or subjective degrees of belief, or credences)
and p( · ) to denote objective probabilities, we can give the following state-
ment of PP:
(PP) c[A|p(A) = x,K] = x,
where A is the outcome of a chance process (e.g. ‘heads’), and K is the rest
of our background knowledge, presumed to contain no information relevant
to whether A will be true or not. PP, or something very much like it, is
obviously central to what we think objective chances are, and what they are
for, and it is widely accepted that the ability to rationalise PP is a necessary
condition for the acceptability of any account of objective chance.
Given what we have said about frequency tolerance, it is clear that HBS
accounts can offer a rationalisation of PP along ‘consequentialist’ lines (in
the terminology of Strevens (1999)). Due to their moderate frequency intol-
erance, HBS views do not permit large-scale, serious departures of the actual
frequencies from the Humean chances, and hence predictions based on these
chances (if we assume that somehow they are known to us) are bound not
to lead us dramatically astray, over a large span of time and/or space. In
that sense, it is reasonable to make one’s degrees of belief match what one
takes to be the objective chances. Arguably, simple actual frequentism is
even better suited to such a consequentialist justification of PP, but we have
already seen that actual frequentism is not an interpretive option for GRW
probabilities. (For details, see Lewis (1980, 1994) and Hoefer (2006).)
5 Propensity accounts
While the propensity view of objective probabilities can be traced back at
least to C.S. Peirce, it has enjoyed an unbroken chain of advocates in more
recent times largely because of the work of Karl Popper, who reintroduced
the view in philosophy of science precisely to provide an interpretation of
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probabilities in quantum mechanics. A number of authors have offered views
that deserve to be called propensity views, even though some reject the label
itself; a partial list would include Mellor (1971), Giere (1973), Fetzer (1981),
Humphreys (1989), Miller (1996), and Gillies (2000).
What all propensity views have in common is the attribution of a kind of
disposition or tendency to chancy systems, a disposition that is in some sense
quantified by the objective probabilities we attribute to such systems. This
attribution is meant to be taken in a strongly realist fashion as this tendency
is regarded by its proponents as an ‘ingredient’ of reality (Hall 2004), and
certainly is held not to be reducible to Humean, purely occurrent facts. So
two consequences are commonly shared by propensity theorists: (a) if the
world is governed by deterministic laws, then there are in fact no propensities;
(b) two possible worlds might coincide completely concerning the Humean
mosaic of facts and events, yet have different propensities. Typically this
claim is motivated by having us consider two possible worlds in which the
occurrent facts are the same, but (we are told) different probabilistic laws
govern the two worlds.
Propensities are dispositions, but dispositions to what? There are two
ways of answering this question, and hence two main types of propensity
theory. Single case propensity theories say that propensities are non-surefire
dispositions to produce outcomes in trials or instantiations of the setup. So,
for example, a 2-dice-rolling setup will have a tendency of strength 1/36 to
produce the outcome double-six. These tendencies may be thought of as
analogous to forces, though forces that do not always succeed in ‘pushing’
the system in the direction they point. Long run propensity theories deny
that this is the right way to think of the setup’s propensities; instead, they
say that the setup has a tendency to produce double-six with a frequency of
approximately 1/36, when a long series of trials is performed.
In the context of GRW theory the long run propensity view is a non-
starter. The aim of this view is to explain the long run frequencies, which
the frequentist takes as a given, by grounding them in specific properties of
the setup, guaranteeing that certain long run frequencies would be produced
if trials were indefinitely extended. However, as we have seen in section 3,
in a world governed by GRW theory there are no sequences of hits involving
precisely the same outcome-attributes for which limiting frequencies could be
defined and subsequent events are not probabilistically independent, which
precludes a frequentist understanding of GRW probabilities. Hence there is
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simply no explanandum and long run frequentism becomes obsolete.
By contrast, single case propensities seem to be a very natural inter-
pretation of GRW probabilities.23 For one thing, the textual explanations
that accompany the equations of most presentations of GRW theory - and
such texts always play a critical role in establishing a theory’s content; no
physical theory is just its equations - are most naturally read as ascribing
inherent tendencies to collapse to the wave functions of individual quantum
systems (e.g. the Ghirardi quote in section 2); there is no talk of ensembles,
or of what statistics one should expect to find after repeated measurements
of identically prepared systems. Moreover, physicists impose no constraints
on what sorts of possible worlds should be taken seriously. We may discuss
lone-particle worlds and few-particle worlds.
This impression bears out when we look at the details of the theory. The
GRW dynamics incorporates two coupled random process; they are coupled
in the sense that one provides the trigger for the other. When a hit occurs,
the system chooses a hit centre according to Eq. (2) and the state changes
according to Eq. (1). The probability of the next hit being centred around x
depends on the shape of the wave function immediately before the hit and,
as we have seen in section 3, each hit is unique in the sense that the same
wave function never recurs. So it seems natural to say that for every possible
localisation event Hx the wave function has a (single case) propensity to
undergo this particular localisation (assuming, as before, a discretization of
space to guarantee these probabilities a finite non-zero value).
The occurrence of a localisation can be understood along the lines of
tossing a coin, where the occurrence of a hit plays the role of the landing
of the coin. But what triggers that hit to occur? There does not seem to
be a triggering condition of the same kind present. Indeed there isn’t; but
none is needed. Not all propensities need to have triggering conditions of the
kind we find in the case of the coin flip. Consider David Miller’s example
of his probability for survival one year from today, which he explains as the
‘propensity for today’s world to develop in a year’s time into a world in which
I am still alive’ (1994, p. 189). This propensity need not be triggered by
23Peter Milne (1985) presents a neat argument for the conclusion that propensities, as
expounded by Popper, cannot explain the two slit experiment, and quantum behaviour
more generally. However, the problem lies with Popper’s particular version of propensities
and not with propensities per se. For a further discussion of Milne’s argument see Sua´rez
(2004).
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anything; the world today just has the propensity develop in this particular
way. If anything, this propensity is conditional on the entire state of the
universe now, which is not a trigger in the way a throw is a trigger when
throwing a dice. The occurrence of hits according to GRW theory follows
the same pattern. There is a chance of λdt for each elementary constituent
to decay during dt and all that is needed for this is that the thing is an
elementary constituent because it is, according to the theory, a fundamental
property of such constituents that they undergo hits with probabilities given
by the theory. Hence also the second random process postulated by GRW
can be understood on the basis of the single case propensity view.
What about the canonical objections raised against single-case propensi-
ties? Some of these have little or no bite in the GRW context. The reference
class problem does not arise in any variant of quantum mechanics. Once a
system’s quantum state is specified, the probabilities for all relevant events
are fixed and GRW theory itself tells us that no further facts about the sys-
tem are relevant to its chances of doing this or that. Hence, GRW theory
rules out any reference class problem.
Humphreys’ paradox takes to task the propensity theory - taken as an
interpretation of all objective probabilities - for the oddity of temporally
backward-looking probabilities of the sort that Bayes’ theorem often lets us
calculate.24 It simply does not seem right to ask what the propensity of a
coin is to be tossed given that it has come up heads. But the advocate of a
propensity account of GRW probabilities is under no obligation to say that
all objective probabilities are single-case propensities. Instead she can assert
that GRW propensities are all forward-looking in time; and should someone
calculate backwards backward-looking probabilities these would have to be
understood as subjective probabilities grounded objectively on GRW proba-
bilities via the Principal Principle (assuming she is justified in claiming use of
that principle - see below). This is a response that any advocate of objective
quantum probabilities will wish to make; it is a remarkable fact of quantum
theory that the probabilities directly given in the theory (using the Born
24Humphreys’ original paradox, properly speaking, is an argument to the effect that
propensities cannot be probabilities, because if they are so regarded one can derive con-
tradictory conclusions. Humphreys (1985) uses a quantum-mechanical setup to derive the
paradox. Humphreys’ own view is that some probabilities do represent causal propensities,
but that causal propensities per se cannot be probabilities in the sense of satisfying all the
axioms and theorems of the probability calculus.
26
interpretation of the wave function), as well as the GRW hit probabilities,
are always forward-looking.
Things look less bright when it comes to other objections to single-case
propensities, and the root of most of the problems lies in the unrestricted
frequency tolerance of propensities. According to a strict reading of propen-
sity views, literally any sequence of physically possible events, no matter how
‘improbable’, is logically compatible with the propensities ascribed by GRW
quantum mechanics. Conversely, the ‘true’ single-case propensities governing
particles in our world might be radically different from what GRW (and QM
generally) say they are, the apparent agreement of the latter with observa-
tions being merely a highly ‘improbable’ accident. One wants to say that we
are justified in disregarding such near-impossibilities, due to their incredibly
low likelihood. This is to say that we should have a corresponding incredibly
low subjective degree of belief in such propensity/event mismatches, and for
this to be justified, we need to be sure that it is reasonable to apply the
Principal Principle to GRW-QM propensities.
So, is PP rational and justified on a single-case propensity view of ob-
jective chances? Notoriously, Lewis and others have thought not. Here is
where the metaphysical, primitive character of postulated propensities ex-
acts its price, leaving the advocate unable to explain why the possession of
such primitive, ‘numerical dispositions’ should justify our adopting certain
degrees of belief. Those who adopt a propensity interpretation of (some)
objective probabilities tend to see it as obvious that if we believe a physical
system has a ‘disposition of strength 0.001 to give rise to outcome A’, then
(in lieu of further information, at least) we should set our credence in A’s
occurrence equal to 0.001. They view this inference as analytic, or in need
of no argument at least. By contrast the sceptic about propensities, who is
likely to be a sceptic about dispositions, powers and so forth (unless cashed
out in terms of things known actually to exist), does not see the inference
as warranted at all. Without PP, it appears to be impossible to derive epis-
temic warrant for postulated propensities - even those of GRW, a clearly
‘successful’ theory - from actual events. So the issue is a pressing one.
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6 Probability as a theoretical concept: the
no-theory theory
Despite a long history of successful use of probabilities in many sciences, there
has never been a clear consensus in support of one of the traditional philo-
sophical theories of probability - not even within a single scientific theory or
context. In light of this record of failure, it is natural that some philosophers
have come to question whether we are right to try to come up with an inter-
pretation of probability in terms of other concepts. Rather than looking to
explain objective probability, or chance, in terms of something else, perhaps
we should take it as a new, sui generis theoretical concept, for which we can
have at most an implicit definition, provided jointly by the mathematical
axioms (e.g. Kolmogorov’s) and by the concept’s uses in various scientific
theories. The most recent advocate of the theoretical-concept approach is
Elliott Sober (2005), and he calls his view the ‘no-theory theory’ (NTT from
here on). He describes the view as follows:
‘In view of the failures of these interpretations, my preference is
to adopt a no-theory theory of probability, which asserts that ob-
jective probability is not reducible to anything else. Frequencies
provide evidence about the values of probabilities, and proba-
bilities make (probabilistic) predictions about frequencies, but
probabilities don’t reduce to frequencies (Levi and Morgenbesser
1964; Levi 1967; Sober 1993b, 2003b). Instead, we should view
objective probabilities as theoretical quantities. With the demise
of logical positivism, philosophers abandoned the idea that the-
oretical magnitudes such as mass and charge can be reduced to
observational concepts that are theory-neutral. We should take
the same view of objective probabilities.
If we reject the need for a reductive interpretation of objective
probability, what does it mean to say that a probability is objec-
tive? Taking our lead from other theoretical concepts, we can ask
what it means to say that mass is an objective property. The idea
here is that mass is a mind-independent property; what mass an
object has does not depend on anyone’s beliefs or state of mind.
The type of independence involved here is conceptual, not causal
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- it is not ruled out that an object have the mass it does because
of someone’s beliefs and desires. The next question we need to
ask is epistemological - what justifies us in thinking that mass is
an objective property? If different measurement procedures, in-
dependently put to work by different individuals, all lead to the
same estimate of an object’s mass, that is evidence that mass is
an objective property. The matching of the estimates is evidence
that they trace back to a common cause that is ‘in’ the object
[...]. (2005, p. 18)
We don’t think that NTT succeeds in providing a new account of chance
that brings the endless disputes over the correct interpretation of objective
probability to an end. At least within the context of GRW theory (and QM
more generally), NTT collapses either into a propensity view or the HBS
account, depending on which aspects of NTT one emphasises.
One way of looking at Sober’s account is to emphasise the fact that the
term in question is a theoretical term, which is implicitly defined by the
theoretical context in which it appears. This squares well with GRW theory,
where probabilities are theoretical in the sense that they follow directly from
the theory alone, and no extra theoretical elements such as frequencies need
to be invoked for their introduction (as opposed to probabilities that are
inferred from statistical data as it is often the case in medical contexts, for
instance). NTT then basically says that the probabilities are what the theory
tells us they are. But this is just what proponents of an HBS approach have
argued all along. Hence, on that reading, NTT becomes indistinguishable
from the HBS approach to chance.
Another way of interpreting Sober’s theory is to stress the analogy with
mass and to place the emphasis on the fact that the theoretical term in
question is understood to be referring to a mind-independent property of an
object. We are then committed to the view that probabilities, although im-
plicitly defined by a theory, are mind-independent properties residing in the
objects ‘out there’. What that means in detail may be different from theory
to theory. In the case of medicine or evolutionary theory, the uses of prob-
ability may be quite indifferent to the question of whether individual cases
falling under the scope of the theory have outcomes determined in advance
by their specific features, or not. As an illustration, Sober offers us Persi
Diaconis’ Newtonian model of coin-flips and argues that the standard 0.5
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coin-flip probabilities should be taken to be perfectly objective even though
they are not a property ‘wholly present’ in each individual flip, but rather a
property of the generic event-type of coin flips (2005, pp. 21-24).25
By contrast with what one should say about medical studies, animal
fitnesses or coin flips, the theoretical context of GRW makes clear that the
objective chances posited are intended to be seen as objectively present in
each instance falling under the probabilistic law in which they occur. So on
an NTT approach, we posit that there is a quality ‘out there’ in the objects
that brings about the effects described by the probabilistic theory; and that
brings us, in effect, back to single case propensities.
In sum, whatever its merits in other disciplines, within the context of
GRW theory NTT does not offer anything over and above the options already
discussed.
7 Conclusion
Our examination of how the viable theories of objective probability fare in
the context of GRW theory has left us with just two candidates standing:
HBS and single case propensities. This is as far as physics takes us in this
debate; when adjudicating between the last two contenders we have to draw
on conceptual resources.
Our discussion so far presents the HBS account as superior to the propen-
sity theory because, unlike the propensity theory, it has limited frequency
tolerance, can rationalise PP, and is metaphysically parsimonious.
However, we should mention that whether or not one regards these as
arguments in favour of an HBS account depends on one’s philosophical com-
mitments. Contrary to our convictions, some believe that frequency toler-
ance actually is a good thing because there is no logical connection between
chances and relative frequencies. For someone of this persuasion there sim-
ply is no problem here and the limited frequency tolerance of HBS accounts
would not go into the books as an advantage. Similarly, the sceptic about
25The objectivity of the probability of heads, on Sober’s analysis, derives from the
objectivity of the probability distribution over coin-flip initial conditions. However, though
Sober does not explicitly say this, it seems to us that this probability can be understood in
a frequency sense, which, again would collapse NTT into one of the well-known approaches
to chance.
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HBS points out that one of the account’s alleged crown jewels, its ability to
justify PP, is, upon close examination, beset with impurities. For one thing,
proponents of propensity views are prepared to regard PP as something like
an analytical truth which, as such, simply is in no need of further justifica-
tion. For another thing, they point out that the HBS justification of PP is
not free of problems either (Strevens 1999).
There are further objections that are typically raised against the HBS
account. Many of them are based on intuitions that go against the strongly
nominalist character of the approach. For instance, as a consequence of this
nominalism, Humean chances are radically non-local: what the chance of
a particular outcome is in this system, at time t, is not grounded in facts
about this system and its immediate environment alone, but instead in a
huge variety of occurrent facts, spread all over space and time.
This, however, need not worry the proponent of an HBS account too
much. Whether or not one shares anti-nominalist intuitions may well be
a matter of philosophical taste, and, especially in the context of quantum
mechanics, a critic can’t really get much mileage out of the fact that a theory
is non-local. Of course, the non-locality of HBS chances is of an entirely
different nature than the non-locality brought about by the QM formalism;
events elsewhere affect the objective probability of events here and now in a
logical way that has nothing to do with physical interactions of any kind. But
there is no reason think that this logical non-locality is worse than quantum
non-locality, which is what everybody has to deal with. Quite the opposite.
Logical non-locality is perfectly normal: little James becomes an orphan
instantly when is parents die in a car crash at the other end of the world.
This is the kind of non-locality the HBS theorist has to accept as a result of
his theory of laws, and this seems benign enough.
Finally, it is worth noticing that an HBS approach need not deny the
existence of propensities (or dispositions or tendencies relevant to the pro-
duction of outcomes) per se; she may be agnostic about the existence or
non-existence of propensities, and merely insist that either way, they are
not what makes the objective chances be what they are. In any world in
which the true propensities radically mismatch the produced frequencies,
the HBS chances will still exist and still be apt for guiding expectations,
while the true/hidden propensities (should anyone somehow come to know
them) would not be. Thus a Humean approach to chance is, unsurprisingly,
well suited to philosophers of quantum mechanics who are metaphysically
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cautious.
In sum, it seems to us that the HBS account currently looks like the more
convincing option. However, the final jury in this question is still out and it
remains to be seen whether the propensity theorists can substantiate their
take on PP and frequency tolerance.
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